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OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge 
 This is an appeal from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey dismissing a putative class action securities complaint for failing 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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to allege facts sufficient to plead scienter.  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
affirm.1  
 The Appellants, a putative class of investors, claimed that Columbia Laboratories, 
Inc. (“Columbia”), Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Watson”), and various Columbia and 
Watson executives violated sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
19342 and SEC Rule 10b-53 when they knowingly or recklessly misled investors about 
the results of a clinical trial study (“Study 302”).  Specifically, Appellants alleged in their 
complaint that Columbia and Watson’s statements that Study 302 achieved “statistical 
significance” and “topline results” were misleading because these parties either knew or 
recklessly disregarded that the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) required Study 
302: (1) to achieve a p-value of 0.01; (2) to attain statistical significance for the United 
States subgroup alone; and (3) not to be driven by anomalous results from the two foreign 
testing sites.  Study 302, according to Appellants, did not meet these criteria.   
 A plaintiff claiming securities fraud must satisfy the heightened pleading rules of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”).4  To sufficiently plead scienter, 
                                              
 1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291.  We review de novo the District 
Court’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss.  Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 
806, 808 (3d Cir. 2007).  Because we write for the parties, we recite only those facts 
necessary to our conclusion. 
 
 2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a). 
  
 3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 
 4 Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc., 736 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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the complaint must state with particularity the facts constituting the alleged violation and 
giving rise to a “strong inference” that the defendants acted with the required state of 
mind,5 i.e. that the defendants intended to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.6  To qualify as 
strong, the inference “must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be 
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”7  
And to make this determination, a court must review the complaint in its entirety, 
considering “not only inferences urged by the plaintiff . . . but also competing inferences 
rationally drawn from the facts alleged.”8    
 Here, the facts alleged by Appellants do not create a strong inference that 
Columbia and Watson even knew that the alleged benchmarks would be required by the 
FDA, let alone that these parties intended to deceive, manipulate, and defraud investors 
by failing to disclose that Study 302 had not reached them.9  Appellants assert that 
Columbia and Watson were “fully aware” that Study 302 would be required to achieve a 
p-value of 0.01.10  Their only basis for that contention, however, is that the FDA 
                                              
 5 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). 
 
 6 Rahman, 736 F.3d at 241-42 (citing Tellabs, Inc. v Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 
551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007)). 
 
 7 Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 314. 
 
 8 Id.  
 
 9 See id. at 313.  
 
10 J.A. 138. 
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guidelines generally require that single-trial studies achieve “[s]tatistically very 
persuasive finding[s],”11 and, two years earlier, the FDA recommended that a different 
Prochieve single-trial study achieve a 0.01 p-value to meet that standard.12  Appellants do 
not allege that the FDA ever recommended that Study 302 itself achieve a 0.01 p-value or 
instructed Columbia and Watson to rely on the p-value suggested for the earlier study.  
Moreover, the FDA guidelines for single-trial studies—incorporated by reference in the 
complaint—do not require a 0.01 p-value for a new drug to be approved and do not 
identify any particular p-value for “statistical significance.”  On the contrary, as an 
example of “statistical significance,” the FDA actually describes a single-trial study that 
achieved only a 0.05 p-value.13   
 As for the subgroup data, Appellants do not allege that the FDA ever informed 
Columbia or Watson that statistical significance, or any specific p-value, would be 
required for the United States subgroup, and it is clear from the materials incorporated by 
reference in the complaint that the FDA imposed no such requirement.14  Nothing in the 
FDA guidelines requires that clinical trials meet statistical significance for subgroups 
based on geographic location.  Rather, the FDA guidelines recommend that a single-trial 
study be “consisten[t] across key patient subsets” because large studies may involve 
                                              
 11 J.A. 695. 
 
 12 J.A. 66. 
 
 13 J.A. 692-96. 
 
 14 J.A. 261; 545-46. 
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many participants that may be diverse with regard to “important covariates” unrelated to 
geographic location, “such as concomitant or prior therapy, disease stage, age, gender or 
race.”15   
 Appellants’ arguments regarding subgroup data from the foreign test sites is 
similarly unavailing.  Appellants point out that Study 302 did not achieve statistical 
significance when the results from South Africa and Belarus were excluded, but nothing 
in either the FDA guidelines or the approved Statistical Analysis Plan indicated that 
statistical significance would be required when those sites were excluded.16  Nor do 
Appellants allege that the FDA ever informed Columbia or Watson that Study 302 would 
be required to meet statistical significance for any subgroups.   
 The FDA guidelines do recommend that a single study site should not be “largely 
responsible” for a clinical trial study’s “favorable effect.”17  However, there are no 
allegations that the study sites in either South Africa or Belarus were, on their own, 
largely responsible for Study 302’s favorable effect, and the documents referenced in the 
complaint indicate that Study 302 achieved a favorable effect even when the allegedly 
“suspect” results from the test sites in South Africa and Belarus were excluded.18  
Moreover, the FDA’s concerns with the foreign test sites arose after Study 302 had been 
                                              
 15 J.A. 693.   
 
 16 J.A. 195-96; 692-96. 
  
 17 J.A. 693. 
 
 18 J.A. 381. 
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conducted.19  Appellants’ allegations about a requirement of achieving statistical 
significance for the United States subgroup, or excluding the test sites in South Africa 
and Belarus, thus do not support an inference of scienter.20 
 Finally, Appellants frame the issue in terms of FDA “requirements.”  As the FDA 
representative at the Advisory Panel explained, however, “[W]e don’t necessarily dictate.  
We tell them our advice.  It’s guidance.  It’s not rules or regulations.  It’s just 
guidance.”21  Likewise, while Appellants point out the FDA guidelines identify 
“statistical significance” among the five “characteristics” that may inform single-trial 
studies, the guidelines then caution that none of the five characteristics is “necessarily 
determinative.”  Instead, “the presence of one or more in a study” can contribute to a 
conclusion that a single-trial study would be sufficient to support an effectiveness 
claim.22  Thus, these alleged benchmarks were, at the very most, FDA recommendations 
and were not, as Appellants argue, either required or dispositive of Study 302’s success.   
 In sum, Appellants’ allegations do not raise a strong inference of scienter.  Rather, 
given the competing inferences rationally drawn from the complaint—including the 
publication of Study 302 in a professional journal, the FDA’s decision to convene an 
Advisory Panel to analyze Study 302, four members of the Advisory Panel voting to 
                                              
 19 See, e.g., J.A. 135-36; 294; 491-92. 
 
 20 Rahman, 736 F.3d at 241-42. 
 
 21 J.A. 408. 
 
 22 J.A. 693. 
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approve Prochieve based on Study 302, and Columbia and Watson’s continued 
investment in Study 302 and Prochieve—the District Court properly held that the more 
compelling inference is that Columbia and Watson did not act with an intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud investors.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
